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JOHN MARSHALL AS AN AMERICAN




Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. adjourned the Massachusetts
Supreme Court briefly in 1901 to commemorate the centennial
anniversary of John Marshall's ascent to the Supreme Court of
the United States. This is a piece of what Holmes said (and it
nearly cost him an appointment to the Supreme Court):
If I were to think of John Marshall simply by number and
measure in the abstract, I might hesitate in my
superlatives.... But such thinking is empty in the same
proportion that it is abstract. It is most idle to take a man
apart from the circumstances which, in fact, were his.'
Holmes went on to note that "[a] great man represents a
great ganglion in the nerves of society, or, to vary the figure a
strategic point in the campaign of history, and part of his
greatness consists in his being there."2  Finally, Holmes
doubted that "Marshall's work proved more than a strong
intellect, a good style, personal ascendancy in his court,
courage, justice, and the conviction of his party."3
This is vintage Holmes-which is to say, it is slightly
irreverent, marvelously heuristic, with just a touch of sour
grapes to spice up the brew. Though he spoke of Marshall's
"personal ascendancy in his court," he made no mention of the
personal qualities which made that ascendancy possible.
Ironically, the one thing Marshall's contemporaries commented
about most frequently was his personality and, inseparably, his
character. With few exceptions-the most well-known being
* Professor of Law and History, University of Connecticut School of Law.
1. Oliver Wendell Holmes, John Marshall, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS
267 (1920).
2. Id. at 267-68.
3. Id. at 269.
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Thomas Jefferson and Judge Spencer Roane of the Virginia
Court of Appeals-his contemporaries agreed that Marshall
was a man of outstanding character. Even those who disagreed
with his jurisprudence, like John Randolph of Roanoke, or
Patrick Henry, found much to praise.
The more I read their consistent accounts of Marshall's
admirable personal qualities, the more I am inclined to think of
him as sui generis: a true American original. His inimitable
personal style not only separated him from other statesmen of
the founding generation but connected him to the Supreme
Court in a special way. Accordingly, I would like to explore
briefly the ways in which Marshall the man and Marshall the
Chief Justice were related. To do so, I hope, will yield some
interesting insights into the development of the Supreme Court
as a distinctive American institution. Indeed, both Marshall
and the Court as he left it at his death in 1835 were American
originals.
There is a remarkable convergence of evidence and
witnesses as to Marshall's personal qualities. Take, for
example, the resoluteness and humanity he displayed during
the brutal winter encampment of Washington's army at Valley
Forge-where Captain Marshall suffered alongside his men
and, when the weather permitted, out-raced and out-jumped
them. Then there were his exploits at the Jockey Club and the
Quoit Club in Richmond. Few among the founding fathers had
such a joyous good time. Would John Adams or George
Washington or James Madison ever have been seen down on all
fours measuring a contested quoit with a straw? I cannot
imagine it, any more than I can imagine Thomas Jefferson
joking about the alluring charms of the women who followed
the army (even if he had been there to do so). Or consider the
austere republican architecture of Marshall's Richmond house,
especially as compared to Washington's stately Mount Vernon
and Jefferson's magnificently inventive Monticello. Or take the
Lincolnesque folklore surrounding Marshall. In one oft-
repeated anecdote, a stranger to Richmond offered the sloppily
dressed Chief Justice a small coin to carry a Turkey home from
the market, which he obligingly did. Then there was the image
of the long-legged Marshall on a short-legged mule headed
north out of Richmond to his Chickahominy plantation-with
his thumb in a jug of something that wasn't water. Or the
jokes he told about himself-as when he found himself on
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circuit in North Carolina without trousers (a deficiency which
he humorously blamed on his personal servant). No one, that I
can recall, loved Jefferson's laugh as Joseph Story loved
Marshall's.
Marshall's appointment to the Supreme Court by
President John Adams also comes to mind as a revealing
episode about his personality. Sometime in October of 1800,
President Adams learned that Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth
planned to resign because of ill health. Adams offered the
position first to John Jay, who had served on the Court from
1789 to 1795, and who, on that account, would have been
acceptable both to the sitting justices and to the Federalists in
the Senate. Jay refused, citing the incurable weakness of the
Court. Adams then considered Justice William Cushing-more,
it would appear, for political than juridical reasons. Marshall,
who, as Secretary of State, had Adams's ear, favored William
Paterson over either man. What Marshall did not know was
that the President had already decided to go outside the Court.
To Marshall's great surprise, and the surprise of most everyone
else, the President chose him. The exchange, as he recounted it
many years later, went like this: "Who shall I nominate now?"
asked Adams. Marshall suggested Paterson again and received
a decided no. Then Adams said: "I believe I must nominate
you." And that, apparently, was the long and the short of it.
"Pleased as well as surprised," Marshall recounted, he "bowed
in silence" and left.4 It was a supremely republican moment
and a uniquely Marshallian one as well.
Equally revealing of Marshall's personality was the
opposition to his appointment levelled by the northern leaders
of his own party-the likes of Theodore Sedgwick, George
Cabot, Robert Goodloe Harper, and Rufus King. Marshall's
ability was not the issue. Several of the group had heard him
argue Ware v. Hylton5 before the Supreme Court in 1796 and
had been greatly impressed with his legal ability. On the other
hand, they were not impressed with his personality. First,
there was his stubborn independence from party-as when he
refused to defend the Alien and Sedition Acts. Even more
4. AN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH BY JOHN MARSHALL 29 (John Stokes
Adams ed., 1937) [hereinafter AN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH]. On the
appointment of Marshall, see Kathryn Turner, The Appointment of Chief Justice
Marshall, 17 WM. & MARY Q. 143 (1960).
5. 3 U.S. (Dallas) 199 (1796).
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troubling to the High Federalists were his easy-going nature
and his casual dress and manners, all of which raised questions
about his resoluteness. On top of this was his demonstrated
popularity. How, they wondered, could a man who was so
democratic in his demeanor and so popular with "the people" be
expected to hold them in check? This is precisely what the
Federalists expected the new Chief Justice and his Court to
do.6
To them, Marshall just did not fit the model of an
eighteenth century statesman-or any other model, for that
matter. He was a young Virginia aristocrat who behaved like a
democrat; he was a conservative who distrusted the people but
mingled easily with them. He was a supremely talented lawyer
who became a great Justice, but who was also a genuinely
modest man. Take, for example, his disregard for the historical
record, as compared to almost all the other famous founders.
Not only did he not save his personal papers, but appears to
have destroyed some of them.
Perhaps nowhere is his modesty more touchingly revealed
than in the final years of his life when accolades of various
sorts poured in on him. The modesty and humility he
displayed throughout his life reminds me of what Thomas
Babington Macaulay said of John Hampden: He was "an
almost solitary instance of a great man who neither sought nor
shunned greatness, who found glory only because glory lay in
the plain path of duty."7 What he chose to put on his
tombstone (and chose not to put on it) tells the same story.
Unlike Jefferson, who listed his life's great accomplishments,
Marshall listed only his name and dates, and those of his
parents, and the most important fact of all, that he was the
husband of Mary Willis Ambler.
Probably there is no better way to illustrate Marshall's
personal qualities than to show how they clashed with those of
Jefferson. On all counts this was one of the most creative
hatreds in American constitutional history-and one of the
most deep-seated. To capture the personal and intellectual
differences between the two men, look at the architecture of
6. On the reaction of the High Federalists to Marshall's appointment, see
Turner, supra note 4, at 156-63.
7. 3 THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY, CRITICAL AND HISTORICAL ESSAYS 2
(1907).
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their houses-Marshall's plain brick house in Richmond and
Jefferson's magnificent Monticello. Jefferson was America's
preeminent Enlightenment thinker. His genius, like the house
he built, and continued to build for much of his life, was
experimental, inventive, and speculative. And it was precisely
Jefferson's passion for speculation that most irritated
Marshall, who once referred to his cousin as the "great llama of
the mountain." Jefferson idealized the American people, talked
of what they could and should be-which is why we have
celebrated him. But he was also a bit like Dostoevsky, who
loved the peasants in the abstract, but couldn't stand them face
to face.
In contrast, Marshall was not given to declarations or
pronouncements, especially idealistic ones. I don't recall that
any of his letters so much as mentioned Jefferson's Declaration
of Independence.8 Not only did he not idealize the people, he
had strong misgivings about popular government, especially
when it was driven by political parties and demagogues (which
he accused Jefferson of being).
Jefferson was a grand designer, a man who had a plan for
everything: his own house, the nation's capital, and indeed the
nation itself. Where Jefferson aspired to make America
morally perfect, Marshall settled for a constitutional union
which would weather "the various crises of human affairs," as
he put it in McCulloch v. Maryland.9 Rather than change
human nature, Marshall the conservative realist accepted
humankind as it was. One is tempted to say he had a common
law personality. As a true common lawyer he started with the
facts; he was fearful of abstract thinking, and was positively
hostile to metaphysics and theorizing. It is hard to tell
whether his personality attracted him to the practice of law; or
whether imbibing the "taught tradition"' of the common law
shaped his personality. Clearly, there was a symbiosis between
the man and the law he practiced.
So how does one summarize Marshall the man? He was
practical-minded, common-sensical, plainspoken, and modest,
with a zest for life, and an infectious sense of humor. He was
8. See generally 110 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL (Herbert A. Johnson et
al. eds., 1974).
9. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
10. See ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAw 17 (1921).
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distrustful of theory (especially that imported from
revolutionary France) and appreciative of experience and
history. The latter changed him from a citizen of the British
empire to an American patriot. He was, I would venture to say,
Hector St. John Crevecour's new American-the man "who,
leaving behind him all his ancient prejudices and manners,
receives new ones from the new mode of life he has embraced,
the new government he obeys, and the new rank he holds. He
becomes an American by being received in the broad lap of our
great Alma Mater."11 The American frontier and the American
Revolution made an American out of him. He embodied in his
personality and character the republican culture of the early
Republic.
Jared Sparks (fellow Washington scholar and future
president of Harvard) understood this point exactly. Sparks
traveled to Richmond in 1826 to pay his respects to the aging
chief. He came away in awe of Marshall's republican
personality: the blending into a consistent whole, as he put it,
of "all things about him-his house, grounds, office, himself,"
and how they all "[bore] marks of a primitive simplicity and
plainness rarely to be seen combined." 2 Contemporaries of
both parties and all persuasions agreed.
Having ascertained something of Marshall's republican
character and personality, we might now inquire: What
difference did those qualities make in his public life? In
answering this question, we might begin by noting that
Marshall himself did not ask it. This is not to say that the
easy-going Marshall lacked ambition. But what is striking is
his lack of self-consciousness about it. He did not ponder, as
did young John Adams, the dangers of ambition gone awry.
Nor did he bother to fashion his personal image in order to
advance himself-as did young George Washington (who,
before the Revolution, aspired to a career in the British army,
and who studied the classic rules of etiquette in order to
advance himself in colonial high society). Even when it
counted most, Marshall let nature take its course-as, for
example, at the Christmas Ball in Richmond in 1780. Captain
11. HECTOR ST. JOHN DE CREVECOEUR, LETTERS FROM AN AMERICAN
FARMER 43 (1912).
12. Interview with Jared Sparks (Apr. 1, 1826), in 10 THE PAPERS OF JOHN
MARSHALL 283, 283-84 (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 2000).
[Vol.71
20001 JOHN MARSHALL: AMERICAN ORIGINAL
Marshall, on leave from the army, showed up at the Ball so
unfashionably dressed that he turned off all the pretty girls
who expected to see a dashing war hero-all except his future
wife, Polly Ambler, who fell madly in love with him.
Modesty, in Marshall's case, one hastens to say, did not
mean self-doubt. This plain-dressing, plain-speaking repub-
lican never apologized for his membership in Virginia's
privileged class. In 1782, for example, he cashed in on his
family connections to secure an appointment to the governor's
Council-a place traditionally reserved for established
statesmen. (He also quickly resigned under protest.) He was
an aggressive and highly successful land speculator who felt
perfectly entitled to engrossing a couple hundred thousand
acres of the best land in Virginia's Northern Neck. Slavery
almost invariably went with land and status in eighteenth
century Virginia, and Marshall was no exception to the rule.
As did other white residents of Richmond, he and Polly counted
on domestic slaves-eleven or twelve in the course of his life. It
would appear from his will that slaves also worked the
plantations that he willed to his sons, though it is not clear how
many slaves he bequeathed to his children. The point is that
unassuming John Marshall was also a member of a privileged
elite as the age defined it. Social status did not trouble him,
nor did the ownership of slaves-this, in contrast to Jefferson,
who had tens of dozens of slaves and a slave mistress, and who
worried the problems of slavery, freedom, and republican
values until the end of his life-with no resolution.
Marshall accepted human nature as it was-and himself
as well. Judging from what he did (and from what he did not
bother to say), there was a remarkable correspondence between
Marshall the private man and Marshall the public figure.
More to the point, his personal qualities-his character and
personality-resonated with the age and enhanced his public
influence. He was a republican man in a republican age-
which is what Holmes meant when he referred to him as a
"great ganglion in the nerves of society."13
To illustrate the manner in which Marshall's republican
character enhanced his public career, we might start with his
pre-court career: as state legislator in Virginia in the 1780s, as
spokesman for the new Constitution at the state ratifying
13. HOLMES, supra note 1, at 267.
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convention in 1788, and as a leader of the Virginia Federalists
in the 1790s. Take, for example, his election to the Virginia
House of Delegates in 1795. He had decided to sit out that
election, even though it was a test of Washington's foreign
policy in Virginia. Not only had he withdrawn his name as a
candidate, but he had come out publicly in support of "an
intimate friend" who, as he remembered, was running against
"an infuriated politician who thought every resistance to
France subserviency to Britain."4 When he went to vote,
however, he was accosted by a supporter who insisted on
opening a poll for him. Marshall left, thinking he had
dissuaded him from doing so, only to be informed that evening
that he had been elected. His reputation for patriotism,
honesty, and old-fashioned integrity had a lot to do with his
surprise victory. In the deferential political culture of Virginia,
character went hand in hand with noblesse oblige, just as
personality counted heavily in a society where business,
politics, and law operated face-to-face.
Marshall's character also served him and his country well
in the larger world of national politics and international
diplomacy. Witness his behavior in the notorious XYZ affair in
1798-X, Y, and Z being symbols of the French agents who
demanded bribes from Marshall, Elbridge Gerry and C.C.
Pinckney. Marshall was first to grasp the significance of
French duplicity, and the quickest to respond to the insult to
his country's honor. On his return to the United States, he was
celebrated as an American hero-the man who showed the
tyrants of the old world what republicanism was all about. At
the same time, he showed Americans what the new nation
stood for.
Among those who understood the point was none other
than the great. Virginia patriot, Patrick Henry. Henry and
Marshall had been political opponents since the 1780s when
Marshall first sided with the forces who wanted a stronger
national government. As delegate to the Virginia Ratifying
Convention in 1788, it was young Marshall who was chosen to
answer the states' rights arguments of Henry. During the
1790s Henry and Marshall were the recognized leaders of
opposing parties. But when Marshall's personal character was
impugned during the congressional election of 1799, it was
14. AN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH, supra note 4, at 24.
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none other than Henry who came out publicly in his defense.
His letter is a telling document regarding the nature and
importance of Marshall's character:
Independently of the high gratification I felt from his public
ministry [as minister to France in the XYZ affair], he ever
stood high in my esteem as a private citizen. His temper
and disposition were always pleasant, his talents and
integrity unquestioned. These things were sufficient to
place that gentleman far above any competitor in the
district for Congress.... Tell Marshall I love him, because
he felt and acted as a Republican, as an American.
5
Judging by the way they welcomed Marshall home after his
return from Paris, the American people agreed with the
venerable Henry. 6
Marshall not only acted like a republican-in Paris and in
Richmond and elsewhere-but he spoke and wrote like one as
well. On the republican tone of his legal arguments, for
example, we have no less an authority than William Wirt. Wirt
was one of the ablest lawyers to argue before the Marshall
Court; as Attorney General of the United States after 1817 he
laid the foundation of that important department of the federal
government. In 1803, however, he was a young Virginia lawyer
and an aspiring writer who captured Marshall the lawyer in
action, attesting to the correspondence between Marshall's
personality and his rhetoric. Wirt wrote:
[Marshall] is, in his person, tall, meager, emaciated; his
muscles relaxed, and his joints so loosely connected, as not
only to disqualify him, apparently, for any vigorous exertion
of body, but to destroy every thing like elegance and
harmony in his air and movements. Indeed, in his whole
appearance, and demeanour; dress, attitudes, gesture;
sitting, standing or walking; he is as far removed from the
idolized graces of lord Chesterfield, as any other gentleman
on earth.17
15. Congressional Election Campaign, in 3 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL
500 (William C. Stinchcombe et al. eds., 1979) (quoting MOSES COIT TYLER,
PATRICK HENRY 409-11 (1915)).
16. See 3 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 494 (William C. Stinchcombe et
al. eds., 1979).
17. WILLIAM WIRT, THE LETTERS OF THE BRITISH SPY 178-79 (1970).
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Which is to say, he was an American republican. As to his
republican style of speaking, Wirt continued:
This extraordinary man, without the aid of fancy, without
the advantages of person, voice, attitude, gesture, or any of
the ornaments of an orator, deserved to be considered as one
of the most eloquent men in the world; if eloquence may be
said to consist in the power of seizing the attention with
irresistible force, and never permitting it to elude the grasp,
until the hearer has received the conviction which the
speaker intends.18
Contrast the legal style of Wirt's Marshall to some of the
other great lawyers and judges of the age who relied (for effect)
on ornament and adornment. Take George Wythe, for
example-Marshall's law teacher and the teacher of many
other Virginia statesmen-who never met a Latin quotation he
could resist. Or, there were William Pinkney and Daniel
Webster. Pinkney, the undisputed leader of the Supreme
Court bar until his death in 1822, was known for his way with
words, for his sonorous arguments designed not only to impress
the justices, but also to please the Washington ladies who came
to hear him declaim before the Court. (The great lawyer also
resorted to fancy clothes, and was known to use corsets and
makeup to enhance the performance.) Daniel Webster was not
only a great orator in the grand tradition, but (in sharp
contrast to Marshall) was one of the great self-promoters of the
age, who, with a little help from his friends, could beat even the
devil with his soaring and eloquent lawyer-talk.
In contrast to Wythe, Pinkney and Webster, there was an
unadorned directness and naturalness to all of Marshall's legal
productions. Perhaps the reason was that he had almost no
formal schooling to confuse the matter or invite conceit. To be
sure, he found literary inspiration in English literature, which
he studied under his father's direction. When he spoke about
the Constitution, and for the Court, he drew inspiration and
words (sometimes whole paragraphs) from Hamilton, from The
Federalist,19 and from Sir William Blackstone's elegant
18. Id.
19. See generally THE FEDERALIST (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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Commentaries on the Laws of England2° -which work he had
begun to read even before he set off to fight in the Revolution.
In addition, he drew freely in his opinions on long-winded
lawyers like Pinkney and Webster who argued before him in
the eloquent style of the day.
In the midst of Marshall's eclecticism, however, his own
voice remained distinct. What we see is consistent with what
we know of his personal qualities-which is to say, his
language was straightforward, natural, energetic, unadorned,
and rich in common sense and compelling logic. Marshall's
rhetoric resembled the house he lived in-its strength lay in its
plain republican features. To be sure, Chief Justice Marshall
was the master of the "grand style" of opinion writing. At the
same time, we also see the maturation of a distinctive
American legal plain style, the kind that Wirt described in
1803. Looking at the communicative force of Marshall's
opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland,21 for example-or his nine
newspaper essays in defense of that opinion22-suggests that
the Chief Justice aimed to make the complexities of law
understandable to ordinary citizens. In this respect his legal
rhetoric prefigured the American Renaissance of the 1840s and
1850s, where form and function merged to give American
letters their distinctive character.
And what about Marshall's jurisprudence-the substance
as well as the rhetoric of his opinions? Did his approach to
judging resemble his personality and character, and if so, what
is the connection? Such a question is highly speculative, but I
would venture to say there was, if not a causal connection, then
at least an intriguing parallel between Marshall's republican
character and his law. Which is to say that his judicial
opinions are earth-bound, fact-oriented, non-speculative, and
practical-minded. As Chief Justice, Marshall never lost sight of
the fact that the Court's job was to supply working law for the
new nation. When we think of the law he and his Court
provided, we tend to think of constitutional doctrine-judicial
review, implied powers, the supremacy of federal authority
20. See generally WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND (William C. Jones ed., 1916).
21. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
22. Marshall's essays in defense of McCulloch are reprinted along with an
introduction to the debate in JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V.
MARYLAND (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969).
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over the states and the like. A closer look, however, reveals a
very undoctrinaire mind in action. There are clear principles
in Marshall's jurisprudence, to be sure. Indeed, principled
jurisprudence is one of his hallmarks. But there is also some
healthy and realistic play in the joints: though McCulloch
introduced the doctrine of implied powers into American
constitutional law, it did not create an open-ended constitution
(contrary to what Marshall's contemporaries, like Jefferson, or
modern biographers like Albert Beveridge, have claimed). A
close look at Gibbons v. Ogden,23 and the commerce clause
decisions from the 1820s that followed in its wake, shows that
Marshall resisted a bright-line solution to the allocation of
federal commerce power (the bright line being the doctrine of
exclusivism). Or consider the doctrinal flexibility Marshall
manifested in applying the Court's ruling in Dartmouth College
v. Woodward,24 as in Providence Bank v. Billings,2" or in his
early position after the first argument in the Charles River
Bridge Case in 1831.26
One must not overemphasize the doctrinal flexibility in
Marshall's jurisprudence or ignore the fact that it was partly
due to the growing internal divisions on the Court itself. Nor
must we forget that Marshall spoke out boldly for
constitutional truth as he saw it-witness his dissent in Ogden
v. Saunders," or his successful battle for principle in Craig v.
Missouri28 and the Cherokee Indian cases.29 Still, the fact
remains that he was not a doctrinal purist like his friend
Justice Joseph Story. Marshall's instinct was to balance
principle and doctrine with down-home practicality-a sense of
what the American people needed and what history would
allow. In this respect he was like the framers of the
Constitution, whose intent he sincerely tried to follow. In this
same respect he was unlike modern jurisprudes. The kind of
theoretical questions raised by O.W. Holmes, Jr., in the later
nineteenth century, for example, or by legal academics in our
23. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
24. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
25. 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 516 (1830).
26. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
27. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
28. 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 410 (1830).
29. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
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age, did not concern Marshall, or even occur to him. He
thought deeply about the law and how it might be made to
work for the American people, but he did not have the luxury
or the inclination to think about thinking.
Finally, let's consider Marshall's role as Chief Justice-as
the leader of the Court. Here is where personality and
character counted the most. I am referring to the happy
correspondence between Marshall's personal characteristics
and the institutional nature of the Supreme Court over which
he presided. Thanks to the work of Marshall scholars, we
know much more about the way the Justices lived and worked
together than we once did. There is unusual agreement that
Marshall as Chief Justice was the unifying catalyst. Part of his
success, of course, stemmed from his legal genius. When well
over ninety percent of the Court's work was connected to the
common law, it counted strongly in his favor that he was a
superb common lawyer. In an age before printed briefs, when
decisions were rendered shortly after oral argument, it was
important that he had a gift for cutting quickly to the heart of
the matter. When Justices did their own research and wrote
their own opinions, it was essential that he was nimble of mind
and quick of pen. Marshall's authority as Chief Justice, to put
it plainly, rested on demonstrated lawyerly ability. Here-in
fact as well as theory-he was first among equals.
As Chief Justice, however, personality and character
counted for much-though convincing documentation on the
subject is hard to find. Indeed, there is even conflicting
evidence as to how Marshall related to his colleagues. On the
one hand, we have the testimony of critics like Jefferson and
Spencer Roane, who claimed that Marshall bamboozled his
weak-minded and weak-kneed colleagues who in turn let him
subvert the Constitution by turning the Court into a bully
pulpit for nationalism. Marshall vehemently denied the
charges in his newspaper duel with Roane over McCulloch in
1819, and defended the intellectual integrity of his colleagues
as well."° But the fact remains he was a resolute nationalist,
and he did speak for the majority in nearly all of the
constitutional cases during his tenure, and especially the most
important ones.
30. See JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND, supra
note 22, at 8082.
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This does not mean that Jefferson and Roane were right,
however. Indeed, they missed the point entirely. But the
question they raised remains: If Marshall didn't dominate his
brethren, as the statistics suggest, then how did he lead?
Especially, how did he get six, and later seven, Justices to
speak in a single majority opinion?
One of the few extant letters which bear on that subject
was written by Marshall's future colleague, Joseph Story, in
February 1808 during his visit to Washington as lobbyist for
the New England Mississippi Land Company. Young Story
was captivated by Marshall's uniquely personal style of
leadership, and what he observed corresponds closely to what
others attest to regarding his personality. The Chief Justice
dressed very simply, noted Story, and his language was
"chaste, but hardly elegant."31 He had a genius for examining
"the intricacies of a subject with calm and persevering
circumspection" and he unraveled the mysteries of the subject
in dispute "with irresistible acuteness."32 While he lacked the
"majesty ... of Dr. Johnson," in "subtle logic" he was right up
there with the great David Hume.3" More to the point, young
Story was captivated by Marshall the man. "I love his laugh,"
he wrote, "it is too hearty for an intriguer,-and his good
temper and unwearied patience are equally agreeable on the
bench and in the study."34
If Story was right, then Jefferson was wrong-as were the
High Federalists who predicted that Marshall's relaxed
geniality would interfere with his duties as Chief Justice.
Clearly he did not try to dominate his colleagues by the sheer
force of his intellect. Nor did he stand on the authority of his
office. Story tells us that Marshall was the same in his "study"
as he was on the "bench"-which is to say he carried his genius
lightly, mixing ability with patience, humor, and a sensitivity
to the feelings of his colleagues. Marshall won respect by not
demanding it: if he was first among equals, it was because his
brethren conceded him the honor. In the process they also gave
up their habit of writing separate opinions in favor of a
31. See Letter from Joseph Story to Samuel P.P. Fay (Feb. 25, 1808), in 1
THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY, at 166 (William W. Story ed., 1851).
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majority opinion which, in most of the important constitutional
cases, was written by Marshall himself.
This shift from seriatim opinions to a majority opinion was
the most important institutional change in the Court's
history-the essential foundation of the Court's interpretative
powers and its claim to equality in the separation of powers
system. Seriatim opinion writing, wherein each sitting judge
wrote a separate opinion, was the practice of the English courts
at the time, and of colonial and early state courts as well,
including those of Virginia. It was also the general practice of
the Supreme Court under Jay and Ellsworth in the 1790s,
though one catches some glimpse of change during that period.
The cost of doing business this way was plain to see. As long as
the Justices spoke severally, the Court could not realistically
claim to be the chief interpreter of the Constitution, much less
its chief guardian. This is precisely why Jefferson wanted to
reintroduce the practice of separate opinions in the 1820s and
why he urged his friend Justice William Johnson to see to it.
Both Jefferson and Marshall understood that the kind of
interpretative authority claimed in Marbury v. Madison" could
be fully realized only if the Court spoke with a single
authoritative voice.36
There are undoubtedly complex reasons why the Justices
abandoned the practice of seriatim opinions-and why they
rallied around Marshall as the spokesman of the Court.
Ironically, Jefferson's determination to crush the Court and
exterminate the spirit of "Marshallism" was an important
factor because it encouraged the justices to "circle the
wagons." 7 But Marshall's personality and character were
central to the story-particularly because those personal
qualities corresponded so neatly to the institutional character
of the Court. Recall, first, that the Court was a small
institution-only six Justices, including the Chief Justice,
when Marshall assumed his duties in 1801. The Court's term
35. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
36. For an account of Jefferson's efforts to undercut Marshall's authority,
see Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Justice William Johnson (Oct. 27, 1822), in
12 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, at 246-52 (Paul L. Ford ed., Fed. ed.
1905).
37. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe (Apr. 13, 1800), in 19
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, at 120 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert E.
Bergh eds., 1905).
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during this early period lasted only a couple of months; the
remainder of the year was consumed with circuit duties.
Justices left their families at home and took up quarters in one
of Washington City's several boarding houses. Unlike the
modern Supreme Court, there were no separate offices, no
secretarial staffs, no law clerks to help research and write
opinions, and no access to the printing press (permitting
justices to circulate draft opinions and negotiate differences).
Business was necessarily conducted informally and
consultations among the justices spilled over into the living
quarters.
This cheek-by-jowl institutional arrangement provided an
ideal environment for Marshall to work his unifying magic. He
was a revolutionary hero when that mattered greatly (indeed,
it was a qualification for appointment to the Supreme Court
under Washington). And his democratic informality, his
modesty, his sensitivity to the opinions of his brethren, his
patience, and his sense of fairness and openness made him an
ideal facilitator in the small group setting of the Court. He
spoke for the Justices, to be sure, but his opinions, as he
himself admitted, were collective efforts-even during the
Court's so-called "golden age." By facilitating a collective
decision-making process, Marshall invited his colleagues to
think of themselves not as six isolated Justices-which they
had been-but as a single entity.
At no time were Marshall's leadership qualities more
clearly demonstrated, or more amply documented, than during
the circuit court crisis of 1802-a crisis precipitated when the
Jeffersonian Republicans who controlled Congress repealed the
Federalist Judiciary Act of 1801. Among other things, the
Repeal Act restored the circuit-riding duties of the Supreme
Court, duties which had been abolished by the Act of 1801.
Gone also were the sixteen new circuit judgeships which had
been created to take the place of circuit riding-judgeships
which had been filled at the last minute by Federalist
appointees (one' of whom was Marshall's brother James
Markham Marshall).
The pressing question facing Marshall and the Court in
April 1802 was whether they should ride spring circuit as
required by the Repeal Act. To do so would concede the
constitutionality of the Act-a precipitous thing to do, since it
was being challenged by the newly appointed circuit judges on
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the ground that they were being denied office in violation of the
life-tenure provisions of Article III of the Constitution. Not to
ride circuit as required by the new Act, on the other hand,
would put the Court on a collision course with President
Jefferson and the Republican majority in Congress. Among
those who wanted a showdown was Justice Samuel Chase, the
ablest of Marshall's new colleagues and one of the most
assertive as well. With principle on one side and practicality
on the other, Marshall was in a bind-a bind made all the more
difficult because he agreed personally with Chase regarding
the unconstitutionality of the Repeal Act.
Marshall's approach to this dilemma reveals much about
his character, personality, and leadership. Especially relevant
is his letter of April 19, 1802 to Justice William Paterson. 8
Marshall began by stating his belief that the Repeal Act was
unconstitutional. After joining Chase on the high ground of
principle-and flattering his colleague's vanity in the process-
he then began to question the course of radical resistance that
the impetuous Chase advised. As he put it delicately to
Paterson:
The consequences of refusing to carry the law into effect
may be very serious. For myself personally I disregard
them, & so I am persuaded does every other Gentleman on
the bench when put in competition with what he thinks his
duty, but the conviction of duty ought to be very strong
before the measure is resolved on. The law having been
once executed will detract very much in the public
estimation from the merit or opinion of the sincerity of a
determination, not now to act under it.
39
Here is subtle leadership at its most subtle. Indeed,
Marshall put into play all of those personal qualities of
patience, sensitivity, and humility which contemporaries
attributed to him. First, he proceeded on the assumption that
the resolution of the circuit question was collective in nature-
that the opinions of each Justice had to be taken into account.
After having solicited their opinions, he then put his own on
38. See Letter from John Marshall to William Paterson (Apr. 19, 1802), in 6
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the line, but without standing on authority and without
cajoling. Then came the art of gentle persuasion. Having
conceded that principle was on the side of Chase, he could then
venture the suggestion that a principled stand might be too
costly. And having taken a principled stand himself, he could
then show his own willingness to set aside principle for the
sake of the Court's survival as an institution-and invite his
brethren to do the same. What the principled but practical-
minded Chief Justice said without actually saying it was that
legal reasoning had to be balanced by a consideration of the
political impact which that reasoning might have-on
Congress, on the people at large, and on the Court.
Marshall's strategy carried the day. The Justices did agree
to ride circuit in 1802, as he intimated they ought to do. And
they put their pragmatism into law the following year, in
Stuart v. Laird,4 by upholding the constitutionality of the
Repeal Act. By acting in unison, the Justices, thanks to
Marshall's deft leadership, had taken a giant step toward the
abandonment of seriatim opinions. When the Court decided
Marbury v. Madison the same year, the Justices also spoke in a
single voice. In the institutional struggles of the early Republic
over constitutional interpretation-between the branches of
government and between the federal government and the
states-this newfound unity was the sine qua non of the
Court's authority.
Marshall's personality and character were decisive in this
early victory. And all we know indicates that the same style-
and the same success-continued to characterize his Chief
Justiceship. To put it plainly: he was in the right place at the
right time with the right stuff. Even when new Justices with a
new tolerance for states' rights took their seats on the Court
after 1823, even when they challenged Marshall's
constitutional nationalism during the last years of his tenure,
he continued to hold a divided Court together by the
moderating force of his personality and character.
In conclusion, we might revisit Holmes' statement that
part of Marshall's greatness consisted in "his being there.""
40. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803). Because Marshall was involved in the case
below, Paterson spoke for the Court, essentially conceding full power to Congress
to structure the lower federal courts.
41. See HOLMES, supra note 1, at 26768.
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While that is undoubtedly true, it was equally important that it
was Marshall who was there. Looking at the way he infused
the Court with his own character, one is inclined to agree with
Ralph Waldo Emerson when he said that "institutions are but
the lengthened shadow of a man."42
42. Ralph Waldo Emerson, Self-Reliance Essays: First Series, in AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN QUOTATIONS 248 (Margaret Minder & Hugh
Rawson eds., 1997).
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